We study the evolution of compliance and regulation in a common pool resource setup with myopic appropriators whose decision on whether to comply or not with the harvesting rule is a result of imitation as described by a proportional rule. The regulator …rst sets the optimal quota and then harvesters can choose between compliance and violation. We investigate myopic regulation and optimal regulation regimes with both proportional and non-proportional …ne formulation and and an endogenized probability of audition. The equilibria are then characterized in terms of their stability properties.
Introduction
Sustainable resource management, environmental policy and enforcement mechanisms have long been the subject of great debate in the literature. Beyond the neoclassical approach that treats economic agents as fully rational agents that have full information and solve maximization problems, there has been a signi…cant growth in the use of evolutionary game theory to tackle the problem. This can be viewed more as an extension of the standard framework rather than as an opposition to the classical game theoretic tools. The main advantages of the evolutionary method is that it can include behavioral norms that arise through the interactions of agents. In this context, it is used to model cooperation and enforcement in common pool resources as in Osés-Eraso & ViladrichGrau (2007) , where behavioral norms are developed through other-regarding preferences.
Alternatively, the notion of self-enforcement and endogenous sanctions among agents in a common pool resource game has been introduced by Sethi & Somanathan (1996) . In their work, whenever the resource is overexploited, i.e. when there is harvesting beyond the norm, the appropriators can e¤ectively enforce harvesting restrictions. Related works include the work of Bischi et al. (2004) , which uses discrete time dynamics and investigates the promotion of cooperation through self-enforcement based on endogenous sanctions. The works of Noailly et al. (2003) and Xepapadeas (2005) provide a combined interaction of resource dynamics and replicator dynamics in a single framework. In the …rst, the price can be regarded as an instrument of environmental policy as it focuses on extraction technologies, while the latter introduces the notion of an exogenous regulator rather than the self-enforcing nature of appropriators and focuses on compliance behavior and violation and the role of auditing probability. The works of Noailly et al. (2007) and Noailly et al. (2009) provide spatial analysis with a sanction mechanism enforced by the cooperating individuals with local interactions. Lamantia & Radi (2015) provide a technological adoption model in an analogous evolutionary framework of renewable resource exploitation and investigate the impact of technology switch has on the resource, in both discrete and continuous time. All the works described above focus on the use of imitation mechanism as seen in Schlag (1998) , also known as the replicator dynamics equation. This is one the most widely used evolutionary mechanisms providing a bounded rationality setup, due to its simple form that allows for analytical solutions. The replicator dynamics is in a sense a proportional rule through which the strategies that exhibit above average payo¤, i.e. they are …ttest payo¤-wise, will spread in the population of strategies and have a tendency to dominate over others. An extensive analysis of the properties, and the advantages and disadvantages of this method can be found in many textbooks such as in Weibull (1997) , Hofbauer & Sigmund (2003) and Schlag (1998) , to name a few.
Modeling compliance behavior in an evolutionary way, as implied by imitative dynamics, can be justi…ed if we assume that agents have bounded ability to analyze certain aspects of the regulation and enforcement scheme as a whole. This bounded ability assumption can be encountered in a number of cases. In the evolutionary study of technical change (e.g. Nelson & Winter (2009) , Silverberg et al. (1988) , Conlisk (1989) ) agents typically show bounded ability to perceive and explore the advantages of new technologies. In compliance related issues, taxpayers show bounded ability to calculate auditing probabilities (see Andreoni et al. (1998) ), while …shermen seem to observe the activities of enforcing agents and communicate with each other in the process of deciding harvesting strategies which involve decisions regarding compliance with regulation (see Nielsen & Mathiesen (2003) ).
The work of Xepapadeas (2005) sets the general framework from which we start o¤, which describes a renewable resource setup that is governed by two opposing forces. On the one hand we have the stock accumulation and on the other hand we have the imitative behavior of agents choosing whether to comply with the harvesting rule or to violate by harvesting more than they are allowed to. The coevolution of those two constitutes a dynamical system, whose equilibria describe the steady state of both resource level and harvesting rule. This is not an optimal regulation setup, but rather a descriptive longrun state after all environmental policy has been implemented. In this work we use the same principle used in Xepapadeas & Petrohilos-Andrianos (2012) , i.e. allowing for myopic and optimal regulation that takes into account the evolutionary process governing the behavior of harvesters. The regulator knowing that the resource moves in fast time, calculates the optimal quota, and then seeks to regulate the resource given the behavior of harvesters. This is done in two ways; the …rst is a myopic regulation, where the regulator directly interferes with the replicator dynamics equation, and the second is the optimal regulation setup, where the regulator minimizes an objective function with respect to the replicator dynamics equation. We address the same problem with both a proportional and non-proportional …ne and draw conclusions about the stability properties of the steady states. It is shown that polymorphic equilibria exist, i.e. both cooperative and non-cooperative rules are present in the long-run equilibrium under myopic and optimal regulation.
The structure of this work is to provide the general setup as a whole at …rst and then use speci…c functional forms in order to derive analytical solutions. The …rst section describes the bioeconomic model and the way the optimal quota is determined. In the second section we provide the general evolutionary framework which is the replicator dynamics equation and its properties. The third section proposes the model speci…cations and functional forms concerning the subjective probability of audition, the ways the stock is a¤ected by harvesting rules and the di¤erent regulation regimes that we consider. The next section provides the model solution until the step that an analytical solution cannot be obtained. A numerical simulation is proposed in order to derive the solutions and stability properties of the steady states of the model.
Bioeconomic Model
Consider a renewable resource with common-pool characteristics, whose stock at any point in time is given by S (t).
1 The stock regenerates in time with a rate given by G (S),
with inverted "U" properties, i.e. G 00 (S) < 0.
We consider that there is a …xed number of n harvesters having access to the natural resource, leading to an aggregate harvesting rate of
, where h i is the individual harvesting level, for i = 1; : : : ; n. Thus, the stock dynamics is the net di¤erence between stock accumulation due to regeneration and stock depletion due to harvesting, namely:
We assume that the individual harvesting level is a function of e¤ort, E, and stock level, S , at any given point in time, given by:
The extraction of the resource induces an individual cost of
Consider that the resource is regulated, since it needs to be managed for its sustainability in the face of the possible danger of the "tragedy of the commons". The regulator will …rst announce the allowed harvesting quota for the appropriators and then perform audits in order to counter any non-compliance. Assume that the regulator is interested in maximizing the total pro…ts produced by the resource, having a clear picture of the stock biomass reserve at the time of intervention. Therefore, she takes into account dynamics, but assumes that the natural system evolves fast in time so that the dynamic equilibrium condition for the biomass can be regarded as a good approximation of the natural system, i.e. setting _ S = 0. 2 The equilibrium stock can now be expressed explicitly as a function of harvesting from (2.1):
The optimal quota can then be calculated by the following maximization:
where P is the world price, taken as given. In order to solve this maximization problem, we …rst need to express everything in terms of the harvest and stock level.
From (2.2), we solve for e¤ort, such as:
and consequently, cost can also be expressed as:
The regulator's problem becomes:
and since the regulator has accurate information about the stock reserve, at the time of intervention, this is equivalent to:
In the next section we shall proceed with the solution for the optimal quota.
Optimal Quota
The …rst order conditions of problem in (2.6) for each i = 1; : : : ; n are:
:::
Imposing symmetry across agents, i.e. h i = h and C i = C, for all i = 1; :::; n yields:
By substituting any analytical solution for = ( P h i ), we derive the optimal bioeconomic harvesting level h . Dividing h by the number of harvesters, n, the regulator sets the optimal per capita quota level,ĥ, as:ĥ
Notice that, optimal per capita quota,ĥ, is now a function of the parameters of the model, and can thus be calculated explicitly.
Harvesting with Myopic Appropriators
After the optimal quota has been announced, the harvesters set the level of their harvesting. Assume that each harvester can only choose between two available strategies. The …rst strategy will be to comply with the optimal quota and harvest exactly the prescribed quantity from the natural resource. We denote the complying harvesting level by h c , for which it holds that h c ĥ . The alternative strategy will be to harvest over and above the allowed catch by violating the harvesting rule. The level of harvest in the non-complying 3 If symmetry was imposed before the …rst order conditions we would get:
First order conditions would yield:
leading to the same result.
case will be denoted by h nc , with h nc > h c .
We will investigate the case of competitive harvesting, in which the non-complying harvesting level will result from myopic and unconstrained optimization of the pro…ts of the violating representative harvester.
Non-cooperative Harvesting Rule
The representative harvester will maximize own pro…ts (h i ; S) = P h i C i (h i ; S), by not taking the self-reproducible character of the resource and any possible …ne-inducing inspection from the authorities into account. Thus, during this process, the stock level S will be treated as …xed and the optimization will be unconstrained. The maximization will produce the optimal non-complying Nash equilibrium level of harvest performed by the violating representative harvester:
The …rst order condition 
Replicator Dynamics
Until now, we have seen the way the optimal quota is set and announced by the regulator.
As far as the harvesters are concerned, they have two available strategies, i.e. comply or not with the harvesting rule.
The mechanism through which the harvesters switch between compliance and noncompliance is assumed to be described by the replicator dynamics equation, implying bounded rationality and imitative behavior. The harvesters will have the tendency to switch to the most pro…table strategy according to the evolutionary game played in the population (see Hofbauer & Sigmund (1998 ), Weibull (1997 , Gintis (2000) ). In order to formulate the replicator equation we …rst need to de…ne the notion of pro…tability for a strategy switch.
Given that the natural resource is being regulated, each harvester faces a probability of being inspected and pay a …ne in case she is caught deviating, i.e. if caught harvesting h nc instead of h c . The probability of being audited did not enter in the decision for setting the non-complying harvesting level, since this was an unconstrained myopic process. On the contrary, when expected pro…ts are formed, it is critical to include this part. More speci…cally, after the two levels of harvesting are set, i.e. h nc and h c , determining the two available strategies, the expected pro…ts after inspection become:
For the non-complying harvester:
where p is the subjective probability of being inspected, and F is a …xed …ne imposed on
For the complying harvester:
The complying harvester, fully commits to the quota regime and therefore pays no …ne whatsoever.
We denote by n nc the number of non-complying harvesters and by n c the number of complying harvesters in the population, with n nc + n c = n. 5 Thus, we express the fraction of each type of harvester in the population by x = n nc =n and (1 x) = n c =n.
The average pro…t or pay-o¤ ‡ow for the population of n agents will be:
Suppose that in every time period dt a harvester, say i; following a certain strategy h nc or h c , learns the pro…t, and consequently the harvesting strategy, of another randomly chosen harvester, say j; with probability dt > 0: The agent will change her strategy to the other strategy if she perceives that the other's pro…t is higher because she follows the other harvesting strategy. If the probability that the harvester i will change her harvesting rule and follow the strategy of harvester j which leads to a higher pay-o¤, is proportional to the payo¤ di¤erence between the two harvesters, then the evolution of the proportion of non-complying harvesters x in the population, can be described by the replicator dynamics equation. This is the proportional imitation rule applied to regulation compliance and leads to the following replicator dynamics equation.
To obtain a more clear picture of the new structure, let
Thus for any expected …ne F E = pF (h nc h c ), and resource stock S, R is independent of x and (3.2) does not have an interior rest point (or steady state) but two boundary rest points x 1 = 0 and x 2 = 1. If the expected …ne is such that R < 0 the proportion of non-complying harvesters converge to x 1 = 0 and full compliance is attained. The full compliance steady state is stable since @ _ x=@xj x 1 =0 = R < 0. We say, in this case, that non-compliance is dominated by compliance, and that the compliance steady state is attracting. On the other hand, if F E : R > 0, the proportion of non-complying harvesters converges to x 2 = 1 and the non-compliance strategy dominates. The non-compliance steady state is locally stable since @ _ x=@xj x 2 =1 = R < 0. The dominating, or the attracting strategy is a Nash equilibrium (see Hofbauer & Sigmund (2003) ). It should be noted that R re ‡ects a full compliance constraint for any expected …ne F E , since its sign determines the direction of the strategy switch.
4 Model Speci…cations
Endogenized Probability of Audition
Before we proceed with regulation, we will endogenize the subjective probability of being audited. We let p be a function of perceived level of violation size, as indicated by x .
Assume that the regulator forms through the auditing process an unbiased estimate of the size of violation and then publicly announces it. Since the harvesters are considered to be able to communicate, by the nature of the replicator dynamics equation and the way it works, we can make such a hypothesis, i.e. the subjective probability of being audited will be a function of the violation level:
It is reasonable to assume that if x is high, monitoring e¤ort will be expected to increase in the future, thus leading to a higher subjective probability formed by the harvester, i.e.
The opposite is expected when x is low, that is high compliance is expected to induce a reduction in monitoring e¤ort and consequently a lower subjective probability of being audited is formed by the harvester.
The exact form of p (x) used for parameterization in later sections of the paper, will be the Kumaraswamy distribution, with a c.d.f. of p (x) = 1 (1 x ) and parameters ( ; ) = (2; 5), exhibiting sigmoid properties, both intuitive and desirable in our setup.
Actual Stock and Harvest Levels
The aggregate realized harvest,H is the harvest level that occurs, when both compliance and violation are present in the population, weighted by their respective shares:
Therefore the actual stock level at any point in time, denoted byS, will be a function of the realized harvest:S :S H (4.1)
We have seen that the non-complying harvester commits a violation of size h nc h c , over the optimal per capita quota level. The violating harvesting level is an equation of S because each individual harvester has a myopic understanding of the stock. However, while the evolutionary game takes place as described by the replicator dynamics equation, the harvest is already taking place, so that each harvest level h nc and h c will directly a¤ect the size of the stock, depending on the level of violation. Thus, the resulting violating harvest level can be expressed as a function of the parameters and the ratio of non-compliers, x , i.e. by replacing S withS in the solution of (2.8) and solving for h nc .
Having found the violating harvest level, h nc , we can substitute it back into (4.1) and …nd the actual stock as a function of x and the parameters, i.e.S =S (x; f:::g). Finally, we can calculate the pro…ts of the non-complying type, h nc ;S , by simple substitutions of h nc andS. Throughout this work, we will be working only with the solutions that ensure intuitive results in the economic sense, namely the ones that produce positive associated pro…ts.
After the pro…ts have been determined, the replicator dynamics equation, can take its …nal form as a function of only x; F and the parameters.
Regulation Regimes 4.3.1 Myopic Regulation -Benchmark Case
In the …rst case of regulation we want to see how arbitrary changes in the policy instrument, i.e. the …ne F, a¤ect the behavior of harvesters in the stage game, as described in the replicator dynamics equation in (4.2). In such a context, the regulator can be regarded as myopic, in the sense that there is no optimization involved during that process, but on the contrary she arbitrarily tampers with the policy instrument, in order to minimize the perceived violation. This will only serve as a benchmark case and a landmark for comparisons with the optimal regulation alternative.
Optimal Regulation under Endogenous Auditing
In the second and most important case of regulation, we will be investigating the optimal regulation policy for the natural resource, given that harvesters act as imitators rather than rational optimizers and that the subjective probability of audition is endogenized.
The regulator has full information about the capacity of the stock and is aware of the incentives for over-harvesting. She is also aware of the fact that harvesters are myopic imitators and will fully account for all these characteristics in the process of setting the optimal policy instruments.
The regulator's objective is to determine the optimal …ne, in order to keep the stock of the natural resource within viable levels for future sustainable harvesting, taking into account the proportional rule governing the harvesters' choice. The ideal stock level, denoted byŜ, that keeps the stock compatible with the original quota level con…guration, is the one formed under full compliance and will be the goal set by the regulator. This will be the stock level resulting when all harvesters comply with the quota, i.e. when total harvest is H (S) = nh c . Notice thatŜ will be a function of parameters, since h c is …xed.
The explicit form of the problem will be given by:
where C F is the cost of policy enforcement.
The current value Hamiltonian of the problem is stated as follows:
Pro…ts h nc ;S and h c ;S are the actual pro…ts generated for each harvester type.
The optimality conditions for (4.4) include:
and will yield the optimal path of …ne, F .
The behavior of the steady states will then be determined by the Hamiltonian system, calculated for F :
_ (x; ; F ) = r @H @x
Model Solution
In this section we impose speci…c function forms according to the recent literature, in an attempt to analytically solve the model in the previously described steps. We assume that:
1. Stock regenerates following the logistic growth:
2. Individual harvest is described by a Cobb-Douglas function with constant returns to scale:
where q is the catchability coe¢ cient, a and b are parameters which lie strictly in the [0; 1] range. We will examine the case where
for the sake of result tractability:
3. The cost induced by the extraction of the natural resource is considered to be a linear function of the e¤ort:
where w is a scaling parameter, also serving as the marginal cost.
Quota
Starting by (5.3) and solving for e¤ort, we obtain:
Next step is to calculate the stock level at the moment of intervention by solving:
The solutions to this quadratic polynomial are:
, in order to have a real solution. The only acceptable solution
, since the relationship between stock and harvest is negative, as dictated by the nature of the problem. The problem of the regulator in (2.6) can now be solved analytically:
Substituting (5.6) and
in (2.7) we get two solutions for the optimal 8 If the non-linear relationship between stock and harvest level causes computational problems, one could resort to a linear approximation around some point given a set of parameters, e.g. around a point H, for which it holds that:
for some calibrated values S 0 ; K 0 ; 0 . The Taylor expansion will yield the linearized function of the stock, for which there will be an equilibrium in the stock dynamics, i.e. _ S = 0.
The expression is a function of H = P h i and can be rewritten as such:
The linearized solution could replace the original, o¤ering algebraic comfort in cases where a closed form solution by using the former is unfeasible.
bioeconomic harvesting level:
We need both solutions to be positive and real-valued. The radicand (wg + nP q) 2 3wgnP q is always positive for all w; g; n; P; q > 0. The …rst solution h 1 is always positive, since (wg + nP q) 2 3n 2 P 2 q 2 > 0, for all w; g; n; P; q > 0. The solution h 2 is positive as long as wg > nP q. Dividing the optimal bioeconomic harvesting level by the number of harvesters, n, the regulator …nds the optimal per capita quota level, denoted byĥ:
For the sake of result re…nement and tractability, we shall continue with the quotaĥ 1 , that is always positive.
Harvester Side
On the harvesters side, we calculate the myopic levels of unconstrained harvesting h nc from (2.8). More speci…cally:
yielding the non-cooperative Nash harvesting level:
In order to proceed with the formulation of the replicator dynamics equation, the …rst step is to calculate the actual stock as shown in (4.1). The aggregate harvest levelH will be given by:H
Therefore, the actual stock can now be directly calculated from (5.7) as follows:
The …nal step is to solve for the violation level, expressing it as a function of the ratio of non-compliers x, and the parameters. In order to achieve that, we replace S withS in (5.8) ending up with h nc appearing in both sides of the equations. Solving for h nc in each contingency will produce the violation level that we need, as follows:
h nc = h (x; fK; w; g; n; P; qg) (5.10)
There are two solutions in (5.10). We keep the solution that produces positive profits and well behaving actual stock. We can now substitute the violation levels back into (5.9) and …nd the actual stock as a function of x and the parameters, i.e.S = S (x; fK; w; g; n; P; qg). The same holds for the pro…ts of the non-complying type, h nc ;S .
Having expressed everything in terms of x and the parameters, the replicator dynamics equation in (4.2) can now be written as: _ x (x; F; fK; w; g; n; P; qg) = x (1 x) h nc ;S h c ;S pF (h nc h c ) (5.11)
Regulation
The next step is to perform regulation in the two regimes, i.e. myopic and optimal setup. In the myopic regime, the regulator tampers with the …ne, which is the only policy instrument at her disposal, in an attempt to drive the non-compliance level as low as possible, through the direct impact that the …ne has on the behavior of harvesters as described in (5.11). This is obviously a non-optimal behavior since the regulator does not take into consideration any costs induced by the policy instrument and is therefore not driven to the optimal choice. In the optimal regime, the regulator has a clear view of the policy objective and the cost it induces. As a result, the …ne selected will be optimal intertemporarily and will lead to the same compliance level as it would have led in the myopic regulation case, if its level was known. 
Myopic Regulation
In the …rst regime, the replicator equation is the relationship that describes the dynamics of the behavior in the population of harvesters. Depending on the parameters we end up having monomorphic or polymorphic equilibria, as depicted in Figure 1 . In the monomorphic case we can attain a stable full compliance level at once, if the dynamics permit it, whereas for the polymorphic case of one interior steady state, full compliance and full non-compliance are both present in the same contingency. In (Pol. a) a small perturbation from the unstable interior steady state x y leads to either total conformity or total non-compliance. The desirable polymorphic case is, therefore, the one that is characterized by unstable corner solutions and a steady interior x y , i.e. the one depicted in (Pol. b). This is also the most realistic of all four contingencies, not mentioning cases with multiple interior steady states that outperform all of the above, in terms of diversity. In the numerical approximation section, we end up with a situation of a monomorphic behavior as in (Mon. a), for low levels of …ne. As the regulator increases the …ne the behavior switches to polymorphic as in (Pol. b), implying that the interior steady state can be stable under certain conditions, e.g. if we have saddle path stability.
Optimal Regulation
In the second regime, the regulator solves the problem in (4.3) subject to the newly formed replicator dynamics shown by (5.11). The current value Hamiltonian of the problem will be:
Notice that the stock target is be given by:
that is when all harvesters comply with the harvesting rule.
The …rst order conditions imply:
Notice that the probability of audition p, and the level of violation h nc , are now functions of the ratio of non-compliers x. The …rst order conditions yield the optimal …ne as a function of the state and costate variables, F (x; ). The hamiltonian system calculated at F will be:
The solution of the system for _ x = 0 and _ = 0 will yield the optimal x and which will in turn identify the optimal …ne F (x ; ).
Special Case: Non-proportional Fine
As a special case, we investigate the non-proportional …ne scenario, in which the …ne is not imposed on the di¤erence between the violation and the quota h nc h c , but is rather a …xed …ne. This will change the replicator dynamics equation and thus the behavior of harvesters and the evolution of their strategies. The proportional rule describing this special case will be: _ x (x; F; fK; w; g; n; P; qg) = x (1 x) h nc ;S h c ;S pF
We expect this …ne to be less e¢ cient in terms of compliance enforcement, as it implies a lower perceived penalty on violators.
Numerical Approximation
In this section we apply numerical simulations due to the nonlinearity of the hamiltonian system. The following parameterization will be used, following Da-Rocha et al. (2014) and Vardas & Xepapadeas (2015) :
, n = 3 or n = 4, p = 10, w = 5, q = 0:045, g = 0:45, K = 7000, r = 0:02.
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The subjective probability of audition is given by p (x) = 1 (1 x ) , with ( ; ) = (2; 5).
As far as the cost of the policy instrument is concerned we assume a quadratic cost function:
where z is the cost coe¢ cient set at z = 0:1. We will focus on the interior steady states that imply the coexistence of both harvesting rules, rather than the monomorphic states of full compliance, x = 0 and full violation, x = 1. It must be noted that the system is very sensitive to changes in parameter values and we therefore present limited results, avoiding any false conclusions and dependencies.
Proportional Fine

Optimal Regulation
In the proportional …ne context we get the following optimal regulation results:
10 The level of harvesters n, is crucial for the tractability of the results. One can think of n as a normalized number for vessels in case of a …shery, or a number of …rms with many harvesters as employers.
Per capita quota Probability of audition p (x ): 0:0161867 0:0134883
In the n = 3 case, the non-complying harvesters occupy 5:7 percent of the population and the harvesting level of the violators is approximately 4:6 times the per capita quota.
With an increase in the number of appropriators, we witness a decline in the per capita quota and an increase in the level of compliance. The ratio of non-compliers is now at 5:2 percent of the population and the violation is 7 times the per capita quota. The slight increase in compliance can be attributed to stock e¤ects due to the increased number of harvesters that make extraction more costly. Since the cost of regulation remains unchanged, an increase in the pro…ts of violators from 1540:1 to 1551:09 needs an increased …ne in order for the interior steady state to be achieved. More speci…cally, notice that with the increase in the number of harvesters, the per capita quota has dramatically an increasing …ne is needed up until a certain point, in order to compensate for the cost due to the reduction of the stock. As the violation increases beyond a certain point, the probability of audition tends to unity, and the …ne required is falling, since the violators pro…ts have signi…cantly lower payo¤ than the pro…ts of the complying harvesters.
Myopic Regulation
In the myopic regulation context, the regulator faces the following monomorphic to polymorphic behavior as described in Figure 4 . As the …ne increases from zero level to higher levels [Frames 1-4 in Figure 4 ], more and more harvesters are switching from violation to compliance. Notice that the phase diagram of Figure 4 , implies two stable steady states,
i.e. the one of full violation, x = 1, and the interior steady state, as shown in Figure 1 (Mon. a) and (Pol. b) respectively. On the other hand, the full compliance equilibrium, x = 0, is unstable. Nevertheless, the stable interior steady state is far more interesting since it implies that in equilibrium, both harvesting rules will be present at the same time. As the …ne level approaches its optimal level F , the system converges to the interior steady state x as determined in the optimal control setup. This can be thought of as an indirect veri…cation of the optimal control problem and is the empirical proof of Pontryagin's principle. The main di¤erence to the optimal control setup is that in myopic regulation the level of …ne may go beyond the optimal level and even lead to higher compliance levels, i.e. lower x . This is obviously not the optimal choice by the regulator in terms of the objective function, but in the speci…c context where virtually we have assumed no constraints, the regulator can drive the system to higher level of compliance to the extent that the policy can be socially, politically or …nancially supported.
Non-proportional Fine
Optimal Regulation
In the non-proportional …ne context we get the following optimal regulation results:
Per capita quota In this context, the violation level increases dramatically to a 36:1 percent of the population, whereas the non-cooperative harvesting level is 4:2 times the per capita quota.
We see that the less stringent penalty system of the non-proportional …ne has increased the ratio of non-compliers by 600 percent from the case of the proportional …ne, implying that more harvesters choose to engage into illegality. Notice that by construction the penalty system does not a¤ect the violation level h nc . The non-cooperative harvesting rule is determined by the compliance level in the population, and since the non-complying harvesters have increased notice that the absolute level of violation is lower than in the proportional …ne setup (280:929 from 308:02 and 273:125 from 310:219). This is the reason the pro…ts of harvesters have also dropped. The level of non-compliance x is again almost 7 times higher than in the proportional …ne case, but has dropped by 3 percentage points in comparison to the case of less harvesters in the non-proportional …ne case. The violation harvest level is 6 times the per capita quota.
It is evident that the non-proportional …ne is far less e¢ cient than the proportional alternative. Notice that the level of non-compliance has risen signi…cantly from a 5 percent in the proportional …ne setup to a 33 percent in the non-proportional …ne setup.
Moreover, the optimal …ne that leads the system to rest in the interior solution x , has also leaped from the levels of 242 through 320, to 1628 through 2162. Notice also, the sensitivity in the number of harvesters, i.e. an increase in n from 3 to 4 comes with an increase of almost 33 percent in the …ne required to achieve it. Having more noncomplying harvesters implies less stock in less time, which decreases the level of h nc since they share less of the resource and extraction becomes more costly. The costate in the non-proportional case is almost ten times larger, which shows the detrimental e¤ect of the change in the policy instrument on the e¤ectiveness to reduce violation. A higher tax is needed to control non-compliance and the cost of an extra violator in the population is extremely higher, as shown by the levels. All steady states, i.e. x = 0:361323, 3 is the level of the optimal …ne and the respective optimal levels of x and .
Myopic Regulation
The myopic regulation regime results for the non-proportional …ne setup has the same qualitative characteristics presented in Figure 4 above. The only di¤erence between the two setups is the fact that in the non-proportional …ne an increase in the …ne level causes a slower transition from Frame 1 to Frame 4. This is due to the lower sensitivity that a …ne increase has on the pro…ts of the non-complying harvester.
This work has focused on a renewable resource exploitation model in which two opposing dynamics are taken into account, namely the resource accumulation dynamic and the harvesting rules of the appropriators. The coevolution of those two forces has been investigated through a di¤erent viewpoint in both Noailly et al. (2003) and Xepapadeas (2005) . Our work introduced an active regulator who wishes to control for the evolutionary behavior of harvesters as re ‡ected by their strategy choice. Assuming that the regulator has information about the properties of the stock and that the natural system evolves fast in time, she chose to instantaneously regulate the resource by solving for its maximum sustainable yield. This way, she found the optimal harvesting rule that will ensure the sustainability of the resource given that all harvesters comply. The harvesters on the other hand were able to choose between compliance or non-compliance with the per capita quota introduced by the regulator. The process of strategy switching is governed by imitative dynamics as described by the replicator dynamics equation, which is a proportional rule that states that strategies with a higher payo¤ will tend to spread in the population, while strategies with less payo¤ will tend to become extinct. Without any regulation or inspections, the violating strategy is always more pro…table. Therefore, we investigated the regimes of myopic and optimal regulation with endogenous auditing probability. The objective of the regulator was to minimize the square deviation from the target stock biomass, namely the stock that would be achieved if every harvester complied. The policy instrument is a …ne that can be either proportional on the level of violation or remain …xed. Our analysis has shown, that optimal regulation can lead to either monomorphic states of full compliance or full violation, or a polymorphic state where harvesters are distributed between the two strategies. We have seen that the nonproportional …ne is less e¤ective and leads to equilibria with a higher share of violators in the population of harvesters. The polymorphic steady state is more interesting due to the realistic element, but the long-run equilibrium of any system like these depends on parameter values and initial conditions, on the nature of the steady states and on policy objectives.
